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FLEXIBLE FEMINISM AND REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE: AN 
ESSAY IN HONOR OF ANN SCALES 
LYNNE HENDERSON† 
ABSTRACT 
Professor Ann Scales began her distinguished career by taking fem-
inism and reproductive justice seriously. She became a leading feminist 
voice and influence on a number of topics. In later years, she returned to 
concerns about reproductive justice by presciently emphasizing the need 
to preserve women’s access to abortions. 
This Essay discusses Professor Scales’s concerns and feminist 
method and then turns to reproductive justice. The Essay notes that, with 
Scales, a right to abortion is foundational for reproductive justice. The 
Essay then examines the increasing narrowing of access to abortion 
through law. The Essay next examines a current crisis over access to 
contraception, including arguments that some contraceptives are aborti-
facients and therefore should not be available and the debate over insur-
ance coverage for contraception under the Affordable Care Act.  
The Essay concludes with an examination of what reproductive jus-
tice advocates can do to stop what appears to be a steady undermining of 
rights to abortion and contraception, drawing in part on Professor 
Scales’s concern with always examining women’s voices and using po-
litical as well as litigation strategies.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The loss of Professor Ann Scales is incalculable. Her contributions 
to Feminist Legal Theory, practice, and education cannot be overstated, 
as participants in this Symposium can all attest.1 With a humanity and 
honesty that will be sorely missed, she bravely worked on many subjects 
throughout her all-too-short life, negotiating dangerous territories among 
feminists, LGBT activists, and legal scholars. She never deserted femi-
nism as a worthwhile and, forgive me, essential lens through which to 
view the law and the world as a necessary ground for study for scholars 
and lawyers. 
This Essay examines one of the primary issues of concern to Profes-
sor Scales (hereinafter Ann, if it is not too disrespectful) throughout her 
career: the fact that most females, and no males, have the ability to be-
come pregnant and bear children. This fact, that females after a certain 
age have the ability to reproduce human life, poses enormous existential 
questions, but that is not my concern here. My concern is more con-
crete—I think Ann would like that term—it is that after a brief moment 
in time that gave females in the United States more power over their re-
productive capacities than they had ever had, those who oppose women’s 
power to reproduce have deployed the law again and again to deny them 
choice and their capacity to decide when and how to bear children. 
The current crisis over abortion in many states, and the fights over 
provisions for contraception under the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA),2 are not only historically familiar, but also encompass 
  
 1. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, The Outsider Within: The Radical, Not-So-Scary Feminist 
Jurisprudence of Ann Scales, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 23 (2013); Patricia A. Cain, In Her Own Voice: 
Ann Scales as Philosopher, Storyteller, Feminist, and Jurisprude, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 53 (2013); 
Jane Caputi, Ann Scales “Imagines Us”: From the Eco-Pornographic Story to the Medusan Coun-
ternarrative, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 65 (2013); Jennifer Chacón, Feminists at the Border, 91 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 85 (2013); Nancy Ehrenreich, On “Having Fun and Raising Hell”: Symposium Honoring 
the Work of Professor Ann Scales, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 1 (2013); Katherine Franke, Taking a Break 
from Acrimony: The Feminist Method of Ann Scales, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 41 (2013); Shannon 
Gilreath, Feminism and Gay Liberation: Together in Struggle, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 109 (2013); 
Tamara L. Kuennen, “Stuck” on Love, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 171 (2013); Catharine A. MacKinnon, 
Raising Hell, Making Miracles: The Everlovin’ Legal Imagination of Ann Scales, 91 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 13 (2013); Ann C. McGinley & Frank Rudy Cooper, How Masculinities Distribute Power: The 
Influence of Ann Scales, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 187 (2013); Robin Walker Sterling, On Surviving 
Legal De-Education: An Allegory for a Renaissance in Legal Education, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 211 
(2013). 
 2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
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one of Ann’s major concerns. I deeply regret that Ann is not here for me 
to thank her personally for bringing reproductive issues back to my atten-
tion in a powerful way and to guide all of us on the difficult road ahead. 
The term reproductive justice seems to encompass all that Ann 
cared about: it captures all the legal, social, cultural, and economic con-
cerns raised by women’s ability to give life. The term evades the dichot-
omy of “pro-life” (whose?) and “pro-choice” (under what circumstanc-
es?). It stands for the proposition that women should not be forced into 
stereotyped roles or treated unequally because they bear children. It es-
capes the frame of either/or that Ann opposed. And, from my point of 
view, that dichotomy was always a loser: Who can be “anti-life” at a 
general level, even if “pro-choice” fed into the increasingly atomistic 
discourse of the late twentieth century? Those frames created a false di-
chotomy of benefits and burdens that consistently overlooked females. 
Ann was always against false dichotomies. 
Part I of this Essay connects Ann’s work and advocacy to reproduc-
tive issues. Part II discusses the current crisis status of legal, safe, and 
rare abortion under U.S. law, long a concern of Ann’s. Part III discusses 
renewed resistance to access to birth control, an issue too easily shrugged 
off after many victories in courts over forty years ago. Part IV asks what 
we, as feminists, can do to restore reproductive justice for females. 
However one defines feminism, I simply do not believe that anyone 
can deny that the disadvantages females encounter by virtue of their ca-
pacity to give life are feminist issues. Men created the religious beliefs 
and secular laws about women, sexuality, and human reproduction 
throughout our history. While we cannot ignore the role(s) of men in 
ensuring reproductive justice and freedom, we must focus on the unique 
experiences of females and the effects that regulating or prohibiting abor-
tion and contraception have on women, their lives, and their relationships 
to others. If we conscript men of goodwill in this fight, all to the good.3 
This is especially crucial now, as I hope to make clear in the following 
Essay. 
I. SCALES AND REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE 
From the beginning of her career as a Harvard Law student, Ann 
was concerned with reproductive justice for women. She just knew that 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Geduldig v. Aiello4 was wrong and 
made no sense.5 I remember seething at the notion that there was no vio-
  
 3. I know some feminists who believe men support abortion so they can maintain sexual 
access to women. That may be a “masculinities” problem. See McGinley & Cooper, supra note 1. 
There are men who pressure women to have abortions, but others who do not and who support their 
partners in their choices. 
 4. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
 5. Ann C. Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 375, 376–77 (1981). 
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lation of the Equal Protection Clause because, as the opinion infamously 
noted, a state law that discriminated against pregnant women in disability 
coverage was not “discrimination on the basis of sex” because there were 
“pregnant women and nonpregnant persons.”6 I seethed, but Ann did 
something about it: Geduldig led her to found the Harvard Women’s Law 
Journal in order to give women a voice in the law and to commit herself 
to feminism and gender justice.7  
Ann’s first article, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, specifically 
criticizes Geduldig for denying women equal status as human beings.8 
Her next article, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 
noted that legal feminists “have, for example, squandered over a decade 
discussing what legal standard could have prevented the outrage of 
Geduldig . . . .”9 She argued that the problem was “not that the Supreme 
Court used the wrong legal standard. The problem was much more seri-
ous: It was that our highest court cavalierly allowed California to disad-
vantage women with respect to their reproductive capabilities.”10 In her 
clear statement about reproductive justice, she noted that the Court “en-
dorsed a modern version of a centuries-old method of domination” that 
legal feminists failed to address adequately.11 Unless feminists confront-
ed the built-in gender bias of the law and the habit of the law to exclude 
women’s experiences and voices, the law would not change. At that time, 
many believed “liberal feminism” could not get the job done because it 
was part of a pre-existing legal vision of the human that had excluded 
women. For many of us, including Ann, “dominance feminism,” as 
grounded in Catharine MacKinnon’s work, held the promise of “freedom 
from systematic subordination because of sex.”12 The antisubordination 
path does not depend on a theory solely grounded on male dominance, 
however. An antisubordination approach also creates opportunities to 
examine other forms of oppression and advantage based on race, LGBT 
identity, and class, which fits much of Ann’s work. 
A. Scales’s Flexible Feminism 
Ann may have started with an outrage over inequalities in law based 
on women’s reproductive abilities, but she moved on to use feminism to 
critique vast swaths of law, from causation in torts to the growth of mili-
tarism in the United States, from pornography and sexual violence to 
  
 6. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20, 501. 
 7. Ann C. Scales (1952–2012), U. DENV. STURM C. L., 
http://www.law.du.edu/index.php/profile/ann-scales (last visited Jan. 3, 2014). 
 8. Scales, supra note 5, at 377. 
 9. Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 
1398 (1986). 
 10. Id. at 1399. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 1395 (citing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING 
WOMEN 117 (1979)). 
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Queer Theory and beyond.13 Because she was committed to what I term a 
“flexible feminism,” she deployed her intellect and respect for others in a 
way that I believe set an example for anyone who refused to abandon the 
“f-word” and who pursued gender justice.14  
For Ann, feminism was broadly defined as those who believe wom-
en (or females of any age) are full human beings who should have full 
rights and responsibilities and whose experience and suffering should 
matter in the law. The law had ignored women for centuries, because it 
was a male field, and it was feminist jurisprudence’s duty to introduce 
women’s voices and experiences. Although Ann was strongly influenced 
by Catharine MacKinnon’s work, she never asserted that there was any 
one path or “right way” to “do feminism.”  
For Ann, feminism became a “method” based on women’s experi-
ences as a gender/sex category, rather than an “essentialist enterprise.”15 
While it is true that the original feminist legal scholars and litigators did 
not attend to the other dimensions of subordination of women based on 
race and class—because they were drawing on what they “knew” 
through consciousness raising—at least they were in positions privileged 
enough to start giving women a voice in the law. Thus, Ann did not label 
them as hopeless or take an aggressive stance toward them in her work. 
She saw that we tangled ourselves in knots over issues,16 only to let the 
male-dominated system remain in power. Despite hurtful disputes and 
fragmentations about what feminism was or was not, and whether we 
should just forget feminism altogether, Ann saw through our respective 
myopias and reconciled what she could. In her articles, she was respect-
ful and thoughtful about divisions as they developed.  
I agree with Ann that the category “female” should not be aban-
doned. For example, in the introduction to her book published in 2007, 
she stated that “the feminism I know is concrete, antiessentialist, contex-
  
 13. See, e.g., Ann Scales, “Nobody Broke It, It Just Broke”: Causation as an Instrument of 
Obfuscation and Oppression, in FAULT LINES: TORT LAW AS CULTURAL PRACTICE 269, 269–86 
(David M. Engel & Michael McCann eds., 2009) [hereinafter Scales, “Nobody Broke It, It Just 
Broke”] (discussing causation and gender bias in torts); Ann Scales, Soft on Defense: The Failure to 
Confront Militarism, 20 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 369, 369–93 (2005) (criticizing the gen-
dered nature of militarism and condemning war); Ann Scales, Poststructuralism on Trial, in 
FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY: INTIMATE ENCOUNTERS, UNCOMFORTABLE 
CONVERSATIONS 395, 398–99 (Martha Albertson Fineman et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter Scales, 
Poststructuralism] (describing her work with Equality New Mexico in amending the state Human 
Rights Act to include “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
See also other essays for this Symposium cited supra note 1. 
 14. ANN SCALES, LEGAL FEMINISM: ACTIVISM, LAWYERING, AND LEGAL THEORY 9 (2006) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). In her book, Legal Feminism: Activism, Lawyering, and Legal 
Theory, Ann explained why “feminism” is the most useful term for female-focused study and analy-
sis. Id. at 83 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 15. Ann Scales, Disappearing Medusa: The Fate of Feminist Legal Theory?, 20 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 34, 38–39 (1997); SCALES, supra note 14, at 8. 
 16. SCALES, supra note 14, at 8. 
File: Vol91_Issue1_Henderson_PRINT_AB_2014_03_19.docx Created on:  3/19/14 1:24 PM Last Printed: 3/19/14 1:24 PM 
146 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:1 
tual, instrumental, eclectic, and open-minded.”17 She eschewed ortho-
doxy in favor of what she termed “pragmatism” in many of her works. 
My interpretation is that she was less a formal philosophical pragmatist 
in her works—although as a person trained in philosophy, she certainly 
knew the pragmatic philosophical literature—and more a “pragmatist” in 
the sense of political flexibility and practicality: If something does not 
work, abandon it; do not cling to a theory or principle if it does not fit 
facts or reality; learn from experience. In other words, she was a practical 
and flexible scholar, teacher, and lawyer. 
Ann learned and grew; she saw things from different points of view; 
she changed or modified her positions when she thought she had been 
mistaken or had not prevailed. She recognized that human knowledge is 
never absolute and that facts and circumstances change. Despite her 
Humean skepticism, or a skeptical attitude towards empiricism, she was 
willing to venture into that field in her later writings.18 Throughout her 
life, she never stopped growing in understanding, while remaining in-
sistent that the category female matters.  
Ann did adhere to one basic principle or moral position: Human suf-
fering is deeply wrong. Law should not cause human suffering. And 
throughout her life, she continued to insist suffering was wrong. She 
stressed that “[s]olutions once embraced can cease to be useful or can be 
coopted by others for bad ends.”19 Thus, there are no ultimate “right” or 
“wrong” answers. Her perspective reflects her pragmatism or practicali-
ty: When what worked once for violence against women or rape reform 
as a step forward at a latter time might have been co-opted or abused by 
existing legal habits.20 For Ann, paying constant attention to develop-
ments and gendered hierarchies was crucial. 
It is no wonder her feminist “sensors” were out as anti-abortion and 
anticontraception forces started to pick up political influence in the Unit-
ed States, just as other issues she cared about were also exploding. Thus, 
in some of her later work, she returned to the issues of pregnancy and 
gender, especially as the somewhat unclear right to an abortion became 
increasingly threatened. 
  
 17. Id. 
 18. See Scales, “Nobody Broke It, It Just Broke,” supra note 13, at 274–75 (noting empirical 
evidence is “never . . . enough” for feminists or anyone challenging power). 
 19. SCALES, supra note 14, at 111. 
 20. See ROSE CORRIGAN, UP AGAINST A WALL: RAPE REFORM AND THE FAILURE OF 
SUCCESS (2013) (critiquing and examining unanticipated consequences of rape reform; noting new 
areas that developed and arguing for addressing these issues); LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED 
MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 9–17, 28 (2012) (critiquing domestic 
violence reform and unintended consequences; making suggestions for new approaches in response). 
File: Vol91_Issue1_Henderson_PRINT_AB_2014_03_19.docx Created on: 3/19/14 1:24 PM Last Printed: 3/19/14 1:24 PM 
2013] FLEXIBLE FEMINISM AND REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE 147 
B. Scales’s Concern for Reproductive Justice 
In her book on feminist jurisprudence, and her chapter, Poststruc-
turalism on Trial, Ann returned to the theme of reproductive justice.21 
She emphasized the need for legal feminists and queer theorists to turn 
their attention back to abortion rights.22 In her book, she used the issue of 
abortion to illustrate how feminist legal methods could apply to a major 
legal area involving gender. While writing, “abortion [is not] an end in 
itself,” she said “[it] is a necessary option for now, and feminists should 
portray it as such.”23 Access to abortion is so intertwined with women’s 
lives and opportunities, including efforts to combat gender stereotypes 
and stereotypical role assignments, it simply cannot be ignored as an 
integral part of women’s lives.24 And, as I shall discuss in more detail 
later, she was correct in observing that, “winning abortion cases is not 
nearly enough . . . . If the federal right goes away, the matter will move 
back to the states and the streets.”25 Ann presciently concluded that 
“[t]his is one of those situations where I suspect I’ll tire political muscles 
that I didn’t know I had.”26  
In Poststructuralism, she urged that “the right to abortion  
. . . is the most critical solidarity imperative at the moment.”27 She envi-
sioned a link between feminists and queer theorists that had not existed 
before. Because abortion is so linked to disciplining the body, recogniz-
ing full sexual equality, and the valuing of certain lives over others be-
cause of gender, she argued, feminists and queer theorists have many 
interests in common and should work together in solidarity to preserve 
the rights of women to obtain safe, legal abortions.28 Solidarity among 
those oppressed because of gender and sexuality was not only possible, it 
was “the only viable option for progressive people.”29 
I agree with Ann that reproductive justice is a core issue for femi-
nist work, broadly defined as working to resist and overcome subordina-
tion and oppression of females. First, abortion and access to contracep-
tion have been the way for women in the United States and throughout 
the world to be safe sexual beings without being forced into a role or 
status.30 Forcing women to bear children at whatever cost to them places 
  
 21. SCALES, supra note 14, at 147–51; Scales, Poststructuralism, supra note 13, at 407–10. 
 22. See Abrams, supra note 1, at 36–37. 
 23. SCALES, supra note 14, at 112. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 114. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Scales, Poststructuralism, supra note 13, at 407. 
 28. See SCALES, supra note 14, at 148–49. 
 29. Id. at 147. 
 30. See NANCY L. COHEN, DELIRIUM: HOW THE SEXUAL COUNTERREVOLUTION IS 
POLARIZING AMERICA 9–16 (2012) (describing reactions to the “sexual revolution” started by the 
birth control pill as being based in “traditional family” values); KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE 
POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 92–94 (1984); Courtney Megan Cahill, Abortion and Disgust, 48 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 409, 439–46 (2013) (discussing stereotypes and roles as well as Luker’s work); 
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them back into stereotyped roles and imposes duties on them no men 
have ever had to bear. Perhaps the core issue is whether females should 
be required to be “mothers” or bear children by the laws still shaped 
mostly by men. Even with adoption as a possible choice once the baby is 
born, forcing women to become pregnant and to carry a pregnancy to 
term against their own decisions is a denial of a woman’s full human 
status, because someone else has determined she must give her life and 
body to another being—presumably because they doubt her full human 
capacities as a moral and competent decision maker.31 Abortion oppo-
nents also argue that the regret of women who have had abortions justi-
fies prohibition.32 Opponents omit the grief women may experience in 
giving up their babies for adoption and the harms to adoptees themselves. 
Moreover, many infants—especially mixed-race, minority status, and 
disabled infants—may never be adopted. 
By focusing on Roe, Ann was perhaps not quite as explicit as she 
could have been about just how much the right to obtain an abortion had 
already eroded when she wrote. Perhaps she believed, as she mentioned, 
that Maher v. Roe33 and Harris v. McRae,34 in which the Court held that 
there was no right to government-funded abortions for poor women reli-
ant on government healthcare, had already substantially eroded abortion 
rights. She probably was also more than aware that in those early post-
Roe years, the Court permitted states to prohibit access to abortions in 
publically funded hospitals, even when the affected woman could pay 
full costs and the state would not have to pay for the procedure.35 Unfor-
tunately, she did not really develop any arguments about the continuing 
erosion of abortion rights after the decisions in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey36 and Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II).37 
  
Jack M. Balkin, Balkin, C.J., Judgment of the Court, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID: 
THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISION 31, 41, 
45 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) (presenting a “revised” opinion for Roe v. Wade); Reva B. Siegel, 
Siegel, J., Concurring, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra, at 63, 76. 
 31. See Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1628–30 (1987) 
(discussing that women are “somehow blameworthy” and have “‘odious’ motives” (quoting Robert 
F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165, 175 n.49 (1985))); Donald H. Regan, 
Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV 1569, 1569, 1621 (1979) (arguing Good Samaritan laws 
should not require such personal sacrifices and articulating non-subordination principle); Robin 
West, West, J., Concurring, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 30, at 121, 130 
(discussing Good Samaritan laws); see also Khiara M. Bridges, When Pregnancy Is an Injury: Rape, 
Law, and Culture, 65 STAN. L. REV. 457, 492 (2013) (noting Carhart II’s doubt about women’s 
ability to recognize the goodness of pregnancy until after the abortion occurs).  
 32. See infra p. 164 and note 147. 
 33. 432 U.S. 464, 464 (1977) (upholding state’s refusal to fund abortions for poor women). 
 34. 448 U.S. 297, 302, 326 (1980) (upholding the so-called Hyde Amendment prohibiting 
Medicaid funding for abortions for poor women unless their lives were at stake or, in this iteration, 
the pregnancy was a result of rape or incest). 
 35. See Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977) (upholding ban on abortions in public 
hospitals in St. Louis); see also Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 491–92 (1989) 
(upholding ban on use of public hospitals and facilities for abortions in Missouri). 
 36. 505 U.S. 833, 874–76 (1992) (upholding all but one restriction on abortions under Penn-
sylvania law and adopting an “undue burden” test for state regulation). 
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II. THE EROSION OF ABORTION AS PART OF REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE 
Those who support abortion as part of reproductive justice have lost 
so much ground in the past few years that Time Magazine recently pub-
lished a cover story on the erosion of abortion rights.38 Indeed, countless 
news stories have appeared in the past year noting numerous new state 
restrictions and virtual, if not total, attempts to abolish abortion after the 
2012 elections. When Time Magazine declares that we are worse off than 
we were forty years ago, when the Court held 7–2 that women had a lib-
erty right or interest in access to abortion in Roe, we should be alarmed. 
This Part discusses the steady erosion of protections for women that has 
occurred.  
Casey undermined the strength of a woman’s liberty interests in 
abortion, subordinating those interests to the “[s]tate’s profound interest 
in potential life” from conception—whatever that means.39 “[A] State is 
permitted to enact persuasive measures which favor childbirth over abor-
tion, even if those measures do not further a health interest.”40 There-
fore, states could go far in promoting “life” over women’s health and 
physical, psychological, and social well-being.  
Abortion opponents have used Casey’s weakening of a woman’s 
“interests” in obtaining abortions and its increased focus on fetal and 
states’ interests and rights to justify increasing restrictions on abortion. In 
Casey, three Justices set the standard of review for abortion regulations: 
Regulations that do not impose an “undue burden”41 or that were not 
enacted for the “purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle” to 
a woman’s access to abortion42 are constitutional. The three Justices un-
dertook a cursory review of a number of Pennsylvania’s regulations, and 
ignored the district court’s factual findings with one exception: The opin-
ion drew heavily on the district court’s fact-finding and other information 
about domestic violence to hold that obtaining the consent of a husband 
was an undue burden because of dangers married women might face.43 
  
 37. 550 U.S. 124, 132, 166 (2007) (upholding the federal “Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 
2003” as prohibiting a certain late-second trimester procedure as, I guess, within the Commerce 
power. I say “I guess” because Justice Kennedy’s opinion for a 5–4 Court only adverted to congres-
sional power to regulate under the Commerce Clause). The Court had struck down a state’s ban on 
all partial-birth abortions in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). Id. at 922. 
 38. Kate Pickert, What Choice?: Abortion-Rights Activists Won an Epic Victory in Roe v. 
Wade. They’ve Been Losing Ever Since, TIME, Jan. 14, 2013, at 38. 
 39. See 505 U.S. at 878. From conception could mean once an egg is fertilized or when there 
is implantation in the uterus. As untold—and unknown—numbers of fertilized eggs never reach 
implantation for reasons beyond birth control, such as a regular menstrual cycle or other factors, it 
seems surreal to say conception begins at fertilization. 
 40. Id. at 886 (emphasis added). 
 41. Id. at 874. 
 42. Id. at 878. 
 43. See id. at 887–98. The Justices also mentioned the history of legal subordination of mar-
ried women as a factor in striking this provision, providing a hint of equality concerns. Id. at 897. 
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The three Justices looked at each individual regulation separately, 
rather than noting the cumulative effects that so many regulations would 
have in creating obstacles to abortion. Thus they myopically overlooked 
the coercive effect that the regulations as a whole could exert on women. 
Waiting times, travel requirements, requirements that doctors tell women 
the risks of abortion and childbirth along with the “probable . . . age of 
the unborn child[,]”44 parental notification requirements (as long as there 
was some form of “judicial bypass” for minors),45 the requirement that 
women hear readings on the “father’s duty” to support the child even if 
the pregnancy was caused by rape,46 and everything else—although 
clearly intended to create obstacles to abortion—passed constitutional 
muster. Moreover, the state could prohibit abortions altogether once the 
fetus became “viab[le]” unless the woman’s life or health were at stake.47  
Exactly what “the life or health” of the woman meant—or means—
remains unclear.48 Perhaps worse, the three Justices implied that women 
could not comprehend the “full consequences” of having an abortion and 
suggested that women would be psychologically devastated unless the 
state mandated that doctors inform them of the nature of the procedure, 
the age of the fetus, and the loss of life involved.49 The arguments of 
anti-reproductive rights advocates about the harm of abortion to women, 
and judicial doubt about women’s moral decision-making capacities be-
came part of the Court’s reasoning, if not the specific “law,” as Carhart 
II illustrates.  
In Carhart II, the Court upheld the Federal Partial-Birth Abortion 
Ban Act of 2003, which prohibited the performance of one type of pro-
cedure used in late-second trimester abortions.50 Not only did Congress 
have the power to regulate abortion, presumably under the Commerce 
Clause, but also Justice Kennedy’s opinion made it clear that he doubted 
women’s capacity to engage in moral decision making. Congress could 
step in because women were not moral agents who could make decisions 
about the procedure used.51 So much for “informed consent”! The major-
ity seemed to take note of abortion opponents’ co-optation of the argu-
ment feminists had used that women are harmed by unwanted pregnancy 
by observing women might be harmed by having had an abortion, espe-
  
 44. Id. at 881 (internal quotation marks omitted). I dispute that in utero human development 
can be reduced to this image. A fertilized egg is not an unborn child. 
 45. Id. at 946. 
 46. Id. at 903. 
 47. Id. at 861, 879. 
 48. See id. at 866, 878–80 (concluding that the interpretation of the circuit court was “suffi-
cient[]”). 
 49. Id. at 882. 
 50. Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), 550 U.S. 124, 124, 168 (2007) (upholding the Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012)). 
 51. See id. at 159. 
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cially of this rare type, instead of carrying the pregnancy to term and 
giving birth.52 
Since the Court decided Casey and Carhart II, opportunistic state 
legislatures and governors have enacted a proliferation of restrictions on 
abortions and abortion providers. .53 The recent trends to require ultra-
sounds, to require doctors to “show the pictures” from the ultrasounds to 
women in the interests of “informed consent,”54 and so on, are trou-
bling. Trends in many states require doctors to tell women that the 
fetus is a full human being from the time of conception—in some laws, 
from the time of fertilization, not implantation55—and increasingly regu-
late abortion clinics on such matters as hall space and medical technolo-
gies in order to force them to close.56 In several states now, doctors who 
perform abortions must be admitted to practice at a local hospital, but 
there are no hospitals that give these doctors admitting privileges.57 Most 
recently, several state legislatures have passed laws prohibiting doctors 
from performing abortions once a fetal heartbeat can be detected—at six 
or twelve weeks, depending on how intrusive the procedure used to hear 
it is—effectively criminalizing even first trimester abortions. North Da-
kota’s legislature passed a ban on abortion “if a fetal heartbeat can be 
detected, or as early as six weeks into a pregnancy.”58 Wisconsin recently 
joined this group of Republican-controlled states.59 “Supporters say their 
goal is to challenge the Supreme Court’s 1973 Roe v. Wade ruling . . . 
.”60 Arkansas passed a ban on “most abortions” after twelve weeks 
“when a fetal heartbeat can be detected using an abdominal ultra-
sound.”61 Texas has enacted restrictions perhaps making many abortions 
  
 52. See id. at 159–60; see also Bridges, supra note 31, at 479–80 (discussing the effectiveness 
of the argument in Carhart II that abortion harms women); Cahill, supra note 30, at 439– 46.  
 53. John Eligon & Erik Eckholm, New Laws Ban Most Abortions in North Dakota, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2013, at A1. 
 54. See Michael P. Vargo, The Right to Informed Choice: A Defense of the Texas Sonogram 
Law, 16 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 457, 458 (2012), for an article that argues this is good for wom-
en, does not harm them, and helps in making a moral choice. 
 55. See H.B. 2253, 85 Leg., 119 Sess. (Kan. 2013). 
 56. Associated Press, Abortion Clinics Face Strict Rules Under New Bill, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 
4, 2013, at A7. 
 57. Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 940 F. Supp. 2d 416, 421–24 (S.D. Miss. 2013) 
(enjoining enforcement of law requiring admitting privileges as an undue burden because women 
would have to leave the state); Michael Martinez & Greg Botelho, Alabama Gov. Robert Bentley 
Signs Law Raising Requirements for Abortion Clinics, CNN, 
http:/www.cnn.com/2013/04/09/politics/alabama-abortion-law (last updated Apr. 9, 2013, 19:05 
EDT) (describing Alabama law requiring doctors to have admitting privileges and clinics to meet 
stringent requirements). 
 58. Associated Press, Most Restrictive Bans on Abortion in Nation Advance, S.F. CHRON., 
Mar. 16, 2013, at A6. 
 59. Associated Press, Court Challenge Filed to Restrictive Abortion Rules, S.F. CHRON., July 
6, 2013, at A10. 
 60. Associated Press, Most Restrictive Bans on Abortion in Nation Advance, S.F. CHRON., 
Mar. 16, 2013, at A6. 
 61. Id. 
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impossible in that state, despite efforts to oppose the legislation.62 Maybe 
these states will agree that abortion is only permissible if a woman’s life 
is endangered, resulting in judicial and medical fear of even determining 
whether the woman will die.63  
At the federal level, the House passed a bill to prohibit abortions af-
ter twenty weeks.64 Other bills introduced in Congress have come close 
to defunding Planned Parenthood entirely because it provides some small 
number of abortions.65 Congress also excluded abortion from required 
coverage under the Affordable Care Act.66  
As it stands now, the laws of most states forbid any insurance fund-
ing for abortions.67 Since Harris v. McRae, Congress has forbidden fed-
eral funding for most abortions under Medicare and has allowed states to 
refuse funding under Medicaid.68 Therefore, I have to disagree respect-
fully with advocates and scholars I admire deeply who have argued the 
abortion issue should be “left to Congress.” We will need to work with 
courts and states right now; if times change, then we can change our ap-
proach—a pragmatic approach Ann might approve. Yet many states are 
not promising either. 
Many of the new state laws seem to violate even Casey. The laws 
appear to be designed to reach a conservative Supreme Court that abor-
tion opponents believe may now overturn Roe and Casey. After all, if 
corporations are persons under the First Amendment, how can unborn 
humans not be?69 Thus, the Court could hold that a fetus or unborn child 
  
 62. See Manny Fernandez, Filibuster in Texas Senate Tries to Halt Abortion Bill, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 26, 2013, at A14 (noting that the bill sought to ban abortions after twenty weeks, require clinics 
to meet the standards of other surgical centers, and require doctors to have admitting privileges); 
Manny Fernandez, Abortion Restrictions Become Law in Texas, but Opponents Will Press Fight, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2013, at A12 (“The measure, House Bill 2, bans abortions after [twenty] weeks 
of pregnancy, requires abortion clinics to meet the same standards as hospital-style surgical centers 
and mandates that a doctor have admitting privileges at a hospital within [thirty] miles of the facility 
where he or she performs abortions.”); Christy Hoppe, Federal Judges Question Whether Texas 
Abortion Law Has Forced Clinics to Close, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Jan. 7, 2014. The case is cur-
rently in the Fifth Circuit. See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 
570 (5th Cir. 2012). Attempts to stay the implementation of the law failed; Justice Scalia denied a 
stay on September 29, 2011. See Supreme Court of the U.S., No. 11A335, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/11a335.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 
2014). 
 63. Associated Press, Bill Allowing Life-Saving Abortions Passers 1st Round, S.F. CHRON., 
July 3, 2013, at A3. 
 64. Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act, H.R. 1797, 113th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(A) (2013). 
 65. See, e.g., H.R. 217, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 61, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 66. See 42 U.S.C. § 18023 (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 156.280 (2012); Cynthia Soohoo, Hyde-
Care for All: The Expansion of Abortion-Funding Restrictions Under Health Care Reform, 15 
CUNY L. REV. 391, 392–93, 416–17 (2012).  
 67. The State of Washington may go the opposite way and approve a requirement that health 
care insurers in that state cover abortion. Associated Press, Legislation Seeks to Make Insurers Cover 
Abortion, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 24, 2013, at A12. 
 68. See supra note 34 and accompanying text; Soohoo, supra note 66, at 392. 
 69. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342, 372 (2010) (holding that corporations are 
persons under the First Amendment for purposes of the Free Speech Clause). 
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is a person under the Fourteenth Amendment. That would effectively 
nullify any right to abortion, as “life” trumps “liberty” and presumably 
women’s equality.  
At minimum, the “right to life” could create procedural hurdles to 
abortion under the Due Process Clause similar to those the Court rejected 
in Doe v. Bolton in 1973.70 Or, more likely, the Court could simply hold 
that abortion regulation should be left entirely up to the states on the ba-
sis that Roe was wrong from the beginning and should be entirely re-
versed. To preserve women’s access to safe, legal, and rare abortions, 
feminists will have to use every tool and all the energy we have. No 
woman or girl should have to endure an unwanted pregnancy because the 
state coerces her into that “decision”—no matter what the circumstanc-
es.71  
Not only do we face difficulties in providing reproductive justice 
for women in the abortion context, but we are also facing a crisis in birth 
control. Not only is abortion at issue, so is contraception. First, there is a 
spillover effect—opponents to contraception, abortion, or both have be-
come adept at characterizing certain methods of contraception as aborti-
facients. An abortifacient can range from anything that interferes with 
fertilization under some religious doctrines to anything that interrupts 
implantation in the uterus. Second, the Affordable Care Act overlooked 
the subterranean controversy over payment for birth control that had 
been brewing. Whether employers—or pharmacists or whoever—should 
have to obey laws requiring payment for insurance coverage against their 
religious or moral beliefs has become a battleground under the ACA. The 
one leading case on requiring employer insurance payments for birth 
control was the California Supreme Court’s decision in Catholic Chari-
ties of Sacramento v. Superior Court,72 but California has been quite 
protective of abortion rights for many years. In the meantime, “con-
science clauses” enacted in many states had already exempted employ-
ers, insurers, and pharmacists from providing contraception to employees 
or customers on religious grounds.73 Now the fight is obvious and na-
tional. The next Part discusses the obstacles for women needing contra-
ception. 
  
 70. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 198 (1973). 
 71. As Donald Regan noted in 1979, “Anyone who attempts simply to deny that there is an 
intrinsic horror to unwanted pregnancy lacks either imagination or compassion.” Regan, supra note 
31, at 1617 
 72. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 80 (Cal. 2004) 
(setting out four-point test for insurance coverage for those employed by religious businesses). 
 73. See Jed Miller, Note, The Unconscionability of Conscience Clauses: Pharmacists' Con-
sciences and Women's Access to Contraception, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 237, 241–45 (2006); Protect-
ing the Rights of Conscience of Health Care Providers and a Parent’s Right to Know: Hearing 
Before the H. Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 29–31 
(2002) (statement of Lynn Wardle, Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young 
University), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_house_hearings&docid=f:80684.pdf.  
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III. EROSION OF THE “RIGHT” TO ABORTION AND SPILLOVERS INTO 
CONTRACEPTION 
In Griswold v. Connecticut,74 the Supreme Court held that the 
choice whether “to bear or beget a child”75 was a “fundamental right”76 
for heterosexual married people under the Constitution.77 A few years 
later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,78 the Court held that the right to access to 
birth control was an “individual right” that did not depend on marital 
status.79 That right, of course, did not require government subsidies under 
the Constitution, but it did reinforce the importance of every individual’s 
“decision whether to bear or beget a child.”80 Over the past forty years, 
the growth of Republican “social conservatism” and power has endan-
gered even the fundamental right to contraception. 
As the Managing Editor of the Thirteenth Annual Review of Gender 
and Sexuality Law in the Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law 
noted in the Foreword, “Who would ever have guessed that birth control 
would be the issue at the dawn of the 2012 election?”81 Yet it was a ma-
jor issue.82 Religious organizations and socially conservative Republican 
and Democratic members of Congress opposed coverage for birth con-
trol. For example, House Republicans refused on procedural grounds to 
allow then-law student Sandra Fluke to testify before the House Over-
sight and Government Reform Committee on rules regarding “Con-
science Clause Exceptions” to contraception.83 Subsequent attacks on her 
when she spoke to the House Democratic Steering and Policy Committee 
on the need for insurance coverage for contraception made it quite clear 
that there are those who would deny access to insurance coverage for 
contraception for women under the ACA—or under any insurance poli-
cies.84  
As we know, opposition to birth control is a part of our country’s 
history. Obtaining access to birth control became a major, and long-
  
 74. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 75. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).  
 76. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 491 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 77. Id. at 485 (majority opinion). 
 78. 405 U.S. 438. 
 79. Id. at 453. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Dustin F. Robinson, Foreword, 13 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 107, 108 (2012). 
 82. The Democratic Party tried to portray these issues as part of a “War on Women” by the 
Republicans in the 2012 presidential election campaign. See COHEN, supra note 30 (discussing the 
evolution of arguments over sexuality, contraception, and reproductive choice that dominated both 
parties from the 1960s up to the 2012 election). 
 83. See Jenna Johnson, Sandra Fluke Says She Expected Criticism, Not Personal Attacks, 
over Contraception Issue, WASH. POST (Mar. 3, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/sandra-fluke-says-she-expected-criticism-not-
personal-attacks-over-contraception-issue/2012/03/03/gIQAJq1UpR_story.html. 
 84. Id.; Robinson, supra note 81, at 107 (“[W]e believe in civilized discourse . . . . We stand 
by our fellow Journal member to the fullest, and we condemn those who would use vile and vitriolic 
rhetoric to disparage and shame anyone who calmly and rationally expresses an opinion.”). 
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fought, feminist issue.85 Since the decisions in Griswold and Eisenstadt, 
states may not prohibit the sale, use, or access to birth control. Federal 
laws governing Medicaid insurance provide for birth control coverage. 
But financing for over-the-counter, non-prescription sales of contracep-
tive drugs is doubtful.86 Religious organizations and others frequently 
frame arguments against access, sales, and even approval, of particular 
forms of birth control as abortifacients, and therefore a violation of a 
right to life. Many opponents would deny access to artificial methods of 
birth control entirely on religious grounds, others on less specific 
grounds. In either case, women in many states could lose access to many 
forms of contraception, which undoubtedly leads to unwanted pregnan-
cies, which of course leads back into the abortion loop.  
A. Rape and Emergency Contraception 
Current federal funding for the poor that prohibits the use of public 
funds to pay for abortions does have an exception for “rape or incest” or 
the “life of the mother.”87 But to qualify, a woman must meet the onerous 
requirements for coverage—the victim must cooperate with law en-
forcement, for example, in order to be eligible.88 Moreover, because 
much of law enforcement still disbelieves women who say they were 
raped, it is a slim thread upon which to rely.89 Despite decades of reform 
in rape law, police and prosecutors, as well as medical providers, are still 
wedded to biases about what “real rape” is.90 Worse yet, funding for 
Emergency Contraception (EC)—most commonly referred to as “Plan 
B” contraception, although a generic exists—for rape victims who are 
brave enough to go to Emergency Rooms (ERs) has become ensnared in 
the battle over abortion. Therefore, even in the case where the law does 
provide an exception to the prohibition on abortion funding, finding cov-
erage is still difficult.  
For rape victims, access to EC that prevents conception can be dif-
ficult if not impossible. Even if a majority of Americans believe that a 
rape victim should get contraception, there is a horrible disconnect be-
  
 85. See generally C. THOMAS DIENES, LAW, POLITICS, AND BIRTH CONTROL (1972) (discuss-
ing history from Comstock laws through Griswold); LINDA GORDON, WOMAN’S BODY, WOMAN’S 
RIGHT: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA (1976). 
 86. Probably someone could argue that over-the-counter sales of so-called barrier methods 
also should not be allowed in this topsy-turvey universe. For example, spermicides, condoms, and so 
on are endangered; diaphragms and cervical caps require prescriptions still, so I haven’t a clue where 
that leads us. 
 87. H.R.J. Res. 440, 96th Cong. § 109 (1979). At one point, the so-called Hyde Amendment 
did not even have a “rape or incest” exception. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302–03 (1980) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Act of Sept. 30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–439, § 209, 90 Stat. 
1418 (1976)). 
 88. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 457.475 (2012).  
 89. CORRIGAN, supra note 20, at 82–95.  
 90. Id. at 69–74, 82–103. 
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tween “real rape”91 and who is really a rape victim. An example: The 
claim that “legitimate rape victims”—an oxymoron if ever there was 
one—cannot become pregnant was a factor in the 2012 elections and 
continues to be.92 As easy as it is to dismiss extremist statements that 
victims of “legitimate rape” cannot become pregnant,93 abortion oppo-
nents continue to make that argument. Moreover, Roman Catholic Bish-
ops and others oppose contraception even when the pregnancy is a result 
of rape. So for a rape victim who seeks contraception, there may be no 
option—even if she acted “fast enough” and was a “good girl” and went 
to an ER. Many rape victims/survivors do not go to ERs in time, but for 
those who do, being denied EC worsens the trauma and horror of rape. 
Rose Corrigan’s empirical study of rape crisis centers and counse-
lors in six states, and her book Up Against a Wall, make it clear that hos-
pitals may refuse to give rape victims EC either because of religious af-
filiation or conscience clauses that exempt them from dispensing such 
medications. Only thirteen states require hospital ERs to dispense EC to 
rape victims “upon request”; six other states only require hospitals to 
“inform” victims that such contraception exists.94 Stranger still is that, 
although in 2009 the FDA approved nonprescription sales of EC for 
women eighteen years and over and subsequently modified the rule to 
allow seventeen-year-olds to purchase EC over the counter,95 doctors in 
ERs still believe they have to write prescriptions and refuse to do so.96 
Thus the trauma is compounded. 
Because Roman Catholic hospitals may fall within religious excep-
tions, and some hospitals or individual doctors in ERs refuse to inform or 
administer EC even in states with such laws,97 rape victims are left to 
flounder. In areas where hospitals refuse to give victims EC, victims over 
  
 91. Id. at 83 (describing law enforcement and prosecutorial skepticism in her study); SUSAN 
ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987); STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF 
INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW (1998); Lynne Henderson, Getting to Know: Honoring 
Women in Law and in Fact, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 41, 41 (1993). 
 92. Associated Press, Republican: Akin ‘Partly Right’ on Rape Comment, USA TODAY (Jan. 
11, 2013, 15:16 EST), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/01/11/gingrey-akin-
rape/1827489/ (quoting Rep. Phil Gingrey, R-Georgia, an OB-GYN, asserting that adrenaline can 
sometimes prevent ovulation); Jonathan Weisman, Obama Camp Seizes on Republican’s Abortion 
Comments, CAUCUS: N.Y. TIMES BLOGS, Oct. 24, 2012 (mentioning both Akin’s “legitimate rape” 
comment in Missouri, and Mourdock’s “God’s will” comment in Indiana). 
 93. CORRIGAN, supra note 20, at 158. 
 94. Id. at 166. 
 95. See Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 164–69 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (summarizing 
FDA changes). The FDA recently announced that Plan B One Step could be sold to fifteen-year-olds 
and that the medication should be placed on pharmacy shelves instead of behind the pharmacist’s 
counter. Pam Belluck, Drug Agency Lowers Age for Next-Day Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 
2013, at A10. 
 96. See CORRIGAN, supra note 20, at 162 (discussing that some, often Catholic, hospitals do 
not have EC on the premises and suggesting that doctors will write prescriptions for it, but will force 
women to go elsewhere to fill the prescription. Ultimately, then, these hospitals are not providing 
any assistance to women seeking EC). 
 97. CORRIGAN, supra note 20, at 178–89. 
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a certain age may have to travel long distances to obtain what is now an 
over-the-counter medication to prevent pregnancy, and they must do it in 
a short period of time.98 Given “conscience clauses” that allow pharma-
cies to refuse to sell EC (or any contraception), it may not be possible for 
a victim who promptly went to the hospital or care facility to obtain EC, 
even over the counter.  
The failure to provide EC for the victim within a few days of the 
rape—24 hours is optimal, 72 hours may be too late—may mean that a 
rape survivor will have to find a doctor willing to prescribe RU-486, a 
medication that causes miscarriage and can be more dangerous to a 
woman’s health,99 and a pharmacist willing to sell it to her, or she will 
have to seek an abortion, a perverse result. Of course another perverse 
result is that failing to give women the power to decide whether to have 
an abortion or get EC may increase inaccurate or false claims of rape by 
women simply to obtain the care they need. Indeed, the original plaintiff 
in Roe initially told the Texas hospital she was pregnant because of a 
rape, because she did not know the Texas law prohibiting abortion had 
no exception for rape.100 These factors argue for requiring EC for rape 
victims.  
B. Contraception More Generally 
Although “[o]ver half of all states have passed legislation that pro-
tects women’s right[s] to insurance coverage of contraceptives,”101 not all 
states require that health insurance cover contraceptive costs. Even in 
states that require payment for prescription contraceptives, health insur-
ance may not be required to cover payments for over-the-counter medi-
cations, such as Plan B/EC. This issue became more public and apparent 
with the passage of the ACA, upheld 5–4 by the Supreme Court in Na-
tional Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.102 Under Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations, the ACA has 
required that health insurance provide coverage for contraception for all 
women as part of preventive medical care.103 These regulations have in 
turn led to numerous challenges from religious groups and individuals, 
  
 98. Id. at 161–65, 180–82, 195–96. 
 99. RU-486 is known generically as mifepristone, and now a battle is going on in the United 
States Supreme Court over whether Oklahoma doctors can prescribe mifepristone and misoprostol 
for their off-label prescription effects that minimize health damage under the FDA off-label allow-
ances. See Cline v. Okla. Coal. for Reprod. Justice, 133 S. Ct. 2887, 2887 (2013) (granting certiorari 
and remanding to Oklahoma Supreme Court); Erik Eckholm, In Mexican Pill, a Texas Option for an 
Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2013, at A1; Lyle Denniston, New Test on Abortion Rights, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2013, 3:50 p.m.), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/new-test-on-
abortion-rights/.  
 100. Texas at the time had no rape exemption. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117–18 (1973). 
 101. Kelly Lyall & Nicholas Schneider, Access to Contraception, 13 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 145, 
149 (2012). 
 102. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2575 (2012). 
 103. See id. at 2577. 
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once again making contraception a major political issue.104 No matter 
how hard the Obama Administration has tried to accommodate the Free 
Exercise Clause concerns, the battle has continued. 
Troublingly, the authors of Access to Contraception in the 
Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law declared, “Reconciling the 
controversy over access to contraception necessarily involves a balancing 
of the conflicting rights of those who are pro-life and those who are pro-
choice, of health care providers and their patients, and of employers and 
their employees.”105 
Exactly where did the rights and interests of women fall out of con-
sideration in this summary? Exactly why do the authors see a dichotomy 
between “pro-life” and “pro-choice” when it comes to the right to con-
traception? Perhaps the authors were so accustomed to typical court 
frameworks for analyzing abortion that gender disappeared from the con-
sideration of, at a minimum, the fact that “the patient” is always female. 
The utter silence—or silencing—of organized women’s groups and voic-
es about the importance of reproductive control in their lives because of 
the dichotomies and doctrinal frameworks that define what is “permissi-
ble discourse” or what the mass media thinks deserves attention may 
have led to exclusion of an Equal Protection analysis. Or, the answer 
may lie in how successfully anti-choice groups, including Feminists for 
Life, have managed to characterize many, if not all, methods of birth 
control into abortifacients. 
In fact, the Georgetown authors examined EC and concluded that 
because “EC can prevent the implantation of a fertilized embryo” it is 
probably an abortifacient, e.g., a method that kills a fetus.106 That as-
sumption is not true.107 But even if it were true that EC may prevent im-
plantation of a fertilized egg, it does not stop a pregnancy after implanta-
tion. To be effective, EC must be taken within 24 hours, and at most 72 
hours, after sexual activity that can produce pregnancy.108 The “implanta-
tion” argument does render RU-486 an abortifacient, as well as DES 
(Diethylstilbestrol, the emergency medicine available at the time I was 
raped), because it leads to the expulsion of an implanted embryo. Many 
think intrauterine devices (IUDs) are abortifacients, because they prevent 
  
 104. See Ethan Bronner, A Flood of Suits on the Coverage of Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
29, 2013, at A1. 
 105. Lyall & Schneider, supra note 101, at 150. 
 106. Id. at 152. 
 107. See Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 164–69 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing the 
medical knowledge about Plan-B and dismissing claim it prevents implantation).  
 108. “Sexual activity” can mean so many things, and many sexual activities can have nothing 
to do with heterosexual intercourse. It is a euphemism for anything that could produce a pregnancy. 
Rape, sexual assault, being drunk when intercourse occurs, or even ejaculation outside the vagina 
can lead to pregnancy. I guess “sexual activity” here is a stand-in for desired, wanted heterosexual 
intercourse, which of course does not fit women’s circumstances in all instances. See Henderson, 
supra note 91, at 57–61(discussing women’s experiences of heterosexual intercourse). 
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implantation of fertilized eggs. Other forms of birth control prevent im-
plantation too, by interfering with the build-up of the uterine wall—are 
they too, then abortifacients? How far out will the arguments go that any 
birth control is indeed an abortifacient or analogous to one? Some of 
these questions may have to be decided by the courts, but we cannot pos-
sibly depend on the courts alone to restore the ability of females to obtain 
legal, safe contraceptives wherever they live.  
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment also provides the 
basis for current major opposition to the interpretation of the ACA that 
requires employers of fifty or more employees in secular business enter-
prises, including education and hospitals, to provide health care coverage 
for contraceptives for women, the subject to which this Essay now turns. 
C. Religion and Contraception 
Religious organizations that run businesses and individual employ-
ers of more than fifty employees have sued to be exempt from the re-
quirement that they provide insurance coverage for women’s reproduc-
tive health, including contraception, based on the Free Exercise of Reli-
gion Clause.109 Despite a series of modifications to regulations proposed 
by HHS allowing religious organizations under many circumstances to 
refuse to pay for coverage for contraception, the suits are continuing as 
of this writing. Although HHS has recently promulgated a “final” rule 
that could moot the following discussion, the matter is by no means set-
tled.110  
The Roman Catholic Church, a major employer in schools and hos-
pitals that are subsidized by insurance, taxpayers, and non-Catholics, 
opposes the use of any “artificial” contraception.111 A serious battle on 
abortion has been going on over contraception for some time: Some 
Bishops have gone so far as to call for refusing communion to pro-choice 
political candidates who are members of the Church.112 This battle has 
extended to contraception with the enactment of the ACA. The U.S. Con-
ference of Catholic Bishops, unhappy with any compromises thus far 
proposed, filed suit opposing any requirement that Catholic employers 
provide insurance coverage for contraception under any circumstances.113  
  
 109. Rachel Zoll & Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Final Gov’t Birth Control Rule for Faith Groups, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS: BIG STORY (June 28, 2013, 18:05 EDT), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/final-
govt-birth-control-rule-faith-groups. 
 110. See Michael D. Shear, Obama Waves White Flag in Contraceptive Battle, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 12, 2013, at A19; Revised rules, 45 C.F.R. § 147.131 (exempting religious non-profits).  
 111. Robert H. Brom, Bishop of San Diego, Birth Control, CATHOLIC ANSWERS (Aug. 10, 
2004), http://www.catholic.com/tracts/birth-control; see The Catholic Church in America: Earthly 
Concerns, ECONOMIST, Aug. 18, 2012, at 32.  
 112. John Thavis, Cardinal Ratzinger Lays out Principles on Denying Communion, Voting, 
CATH. NEWS SERV. (July 6, 2004), http://www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/cns/0403722.htm.  
 113. See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion at 1–3, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Wash. v. Sebe-
lius, 920 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2013) (Civ. No. 1:12-cv-00815-ABJ); Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Are 
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Other employers that are not religious organizations have filed suit 
claiming that the law would violate their personal religious beliefs, and 
therefore, the First Amendment bars requiring them to pay for insurance 
coverage for at least some forms of contraception.114 Thus far, the lower 
courts have split on whether private employers have a strong Free Exer-
cise claim.115 As this Essay was going to print, the Supreme Court grant-
ed certiorari on this issue.116 
It is beyond the scope of this Essay, and beyond the scope of my 
knowledge, to analyze fully the religious issues. But it is not a promising 
picture. While the ACA requirements might have passed muster under 
Employment Division v. Smith,117 because they are laws of general ap-
plicability and not intended to discriminate against any particular reli-
gion, they may not hold.118 Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act (RFRA)119 in an effort to overturn Smith.120 
In City of Boerne v. Flores,121 the Court held that Congress could 
not overrule Smith to require applying a compelling interest test to state 
laws.122 The majority did not say whether Congress could bind itself to a 
higher standard. In 2006, however, the Court held 8–0 that the federal 
government was bound by the “compelling interest” and “substantial 
governmental interest” tests of RFRA in a case quite similar to Smith. 
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal123 held that 
the sacramental use of a controlled substance was protected by RFRA’s 
required tests for Free Exercise cases, but left open whether RFRA ap-
  
Catholic Bishops Seeking a Religious Preference or Religious Freedom? 3–4 (Valparaiso Univ. 
Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 13-1, Feb. 2013), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2209772. 
 114. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1120 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. 
granted, 134 S. Ct. 738 (2013). 
 115. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1296–97 (W.D. 
Okla. 2012), rev'd and remanded, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013) (denying preliminary declaratory 
and injunctive relief from HHS regulations to privately-held corporate employers); Korte v. Sebe-
lius, 528 F. App’x 583 (7th Cir. 2012) (issuing injunction against regulations on grounds of substan-
tial burden on Free Exercise under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act); Order, O’Brien v. Dep’t 
of Health and Human Services, No.12-3357 (8th Cir. Nov. 28, 2012) (summarily granting injunction 
pending appeal). 
 116. Conestoga Woods Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. grant-
ed, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), 
cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). 
 117. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (upholding the denial of unemployment benefits to Native American 
Church members who were fired for their use of peyote, a sacramental drug for some Native Ameri-
can religions). 
 118. See id. at 892 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 119. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012)), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 
(1997). 
 120. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (holding that the Constitution does not require a religious 
practice exception to federal laws). 
 121. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 122. Id. at 511. 
 123. 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
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plied across the board.124 The Court has also held 9–0 that a teacher at a 
religious school could not sue for discriminatory firing under the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, using a broad interpretation of her job duties 
as “ministerial.”125 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and 
School v. EEOC126 suggested that the “ministerial” role of employees of 
religious organizations meant they could lose their rights under federal 
antidiscrimination laws.127 Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination 
against an employee “because of sex” would not apply if the employee is 
“ministerial.”128 The Free Exercise Clause could override federal statutes 
under either the compelling interest standard or under the definition of 
employment, because sex discrimination has never had the highest level 
of protection under the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, a religious em-
ployer may not have to contribute to insurance costs for contraception. 
If the federal government is bound by RFRA, Free Exercise claims 
could trump women’s claims of discrimination for denial of contracep-
tion under the Equal Protection Clause. At no time has the Court held 
that discrimination against women is subject to strict scrutiny under the 
Equal Protection Clause.129 Insurance coverage might be a closer case, as 
contraception is a fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny. But the 
government has no duty to pay for the exercise of even fundamental 
rights such as birth control; thus, employers could argue they also have 
no duty under the Free Exercise Clause. Thus, when faced with a balanc-
ing between religious freedom and women’s equality, the eventual out-
come in the courts is far from clear.130 
IV. SO WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
As Ann wrote, the abortion and contraceptive laws and cases re-
quire the exercise of political muscles we may not have used or did not 
  
 124. Id. at 423 (finding that the compelling interest test applies to a Controlled Substances Act 
case under federal law). 
 125. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 698 
(2012). 
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. at 706–07 (holding RFRA and First Amendment preclude anti-discrimination suits by 
“ministerial”—in the religious sense—employees in a case involving possible retaliatory discharge 
of teacher in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act). 
 128. If the employee’s religion is a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) under Title 
VII, she would not have statutory or probable constitutional protection against discrimination on the 
basis of her use of contraception or pregnancy; if she were a ministerial employee, she would proba-
bly have no protection under federal civil rights statutes. Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-
Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981, 1016–18 (2013); see also Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2012) (defining BFOQ as including membership in a religion). 
 129. The Court first established gender discrimination’s governing standard to be intermediate 
scrutiny in Craig v. Boren. 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (rejecting strict scrutiny and requiring a sub-
stantial relationship to “important governmental objectives” in sex-based classification cases); see 
also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (explicitly shifting the burden to the state 
and requiring an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for sex-based classifications (quoting Miss. 
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 130. Bodensteiner, supra note 113, at 16–20 (discussing weakness of Establishment Clause 
arguments under current cases); Griffin, supra note 128, at 997–99. 
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know we had. As Carol Sanger wrote in 2012, all of U.S. politics, from 
school board elections up to the Presidency, has been in part “infected” 
by the issue of abortion.131 As others have urged, abortion always should 
have been left to the political process—and perhaps unfortunately, the 
time is now. As reproductive justice is now on the defensive, and as po-
litical organizing takes time, I first discuss the need to continue litigating. 
Then, I discuss the silencing of voices for reproductive freedom in the 
public sphere and politics. Finally, in thinking about how to engage the 
political process, I pay homage to Kate Michelman’s “Who Decides?” 
campaign132 because it brings home just how personal and contextual all 
the things Ann cared about are to the abortion decision and contraception 
for women. 
A. Litigation 
Justice Ginsburg is often cited for the proposition that the “political 
process” would have been better than the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Roe.133 But, to quote another controversial decision, Brown v. Board of 
Education (Brown I),134 “we cannot turn the clock back.”135 Although 
recent historical scholarship has challenged the accepted belief that Roe 
set off the current potent opposition to abortion (and birth control?),136 
there is no question that widespread academic and political criticism of 
the opinion in Roe has existed since the case was decided.  
Because of increasingly repressive laws in some states and chal-
lenges to the ACA, we cannot abandon litigation as a strategy, even 
though it is reactive and perhaps confined to current doctrinal approach-
es, at least in the lower courts. Indeed, several lower federal courts have 
struck down extremely restrictive legislation in many states,137 although 
what happens on appeal remains unclear. Even in litigation, there is room 
for some creativity. As a recent article suggests, although abortion may 
still be framed as a liberty interest and litigators are too overwhelmed to 
  
 131. Carol Sanger, About Abortion: The Complications of the Category, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 849, 
857–58 (2012). 
 132. NARAL: REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM & CHOICE, Kate Michelman: Biography, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20000815055758/http://www.naral.org/about/kate_bio.html (last visited 
Jan. 4, 2013). 
 133. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. 
Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 385 (1985). With all due respect to Justice Ginsburg, whom I admire 
greatly, Equal Protection themes haunted these cases, but Equal Protection doctrine for women was 
still quite underdeveloped. 
 134. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 135. Id. at 492. 
 136. See BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE 
SUPREME COURT’S RULING (Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2d ed. 2012); Linda Green-
house & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About Backlash, 120 
YALE L.J. 2028, 2073 (2011). 
 137. See, e.g., Stuart v. Loomis, No. 1:11-CV-804, 2014 WL 186310, at *16 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 
17, 2014) (holding Right to Know Act violated women’s First Amendment rights); Planned 
Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d 891, 900–01 (W.D. 
Tex. 2013) (holding admitting-privileges provision lacked rational basis).  
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develop equality arguments,138 there is no reason that litigators have to 
abandon equality themes that have been developing.139 Nor need litiga-
tors give ground to law review articles and groups claiming women are 
harmed by abortion. In fact, as Professor Carol Sanger has noted, “[t]here 
is reliable data on [whether abortion harms women], and studies indicate 
that the primary emotion women experience after an abortion is relief 
and a feeling of well-being.”140 Moreover, although Feminists for Life 
has promulgated the historical argument that the first major feminists 
opposed abortion, a recent article persuasively disputes that claim.141 A 
number of articles and empirical studies also dispute the use of “judicial 
bypass” procedures as an adequate protection for minors seeking abor-
tions without parental consent.142  
At least legal scholars can do the research to help correct the record. 
We can also work to see that those people litigating cases actually get 
that scholarship and information in time—something the anti-abortion 
and anti-contraception forces have managed to do. Certainly in the age of 
the Internet and online research sources, it should be easier to link prac-
ticing lawyers and advocacy groups with current data and information. 
B. The Silencing of Women 
One mistake abortion supporters made was to let opponents capture 
the term “pro-life” as if there were only one life involved in abortions. 
Rhetorically, “pro-choice,” though it drew on a strand of liberty and 
freedom arguments deep in U.S. history, was and is weak. “Pro-choice” 
also missed the point that abortion supporters were also pro-life—the life 
of the woman, the lives of her existing children, the lives of so many 
others affected. “Pro-choice” may have resonated in the early 1970s and 
1980s under the increasingly individualistic rhetoric of the times, but by 
then, when pictures of fetuses had already appeared in the Texas brief in 
Roe143 and “social conservatives” had gained an upper hand in politics, 
that “libertarian” approach was doomed. Complicating matters further 
were feminist critiques of choice and consent, as those critiques could 
  
 138. Priscilla J. Smith, Give Justice Ginsburg What She Wants: Using Sex Equality Arguments 
to Demand Examination of the Legitimacy of State Interests in Abortion Regulation, 34 HARV. J.L. 
& GENDER 377, 403–06 (2011). 
 139. Id. at 383–84, 407–12 (noting Pregnancy Discrimination Act cases and Equal Protection 
themes in some Court opinions). 
 140. Sanger, supra note 131, at 876. Sanger also observes that relief doesn’t mean the decision 
was not difficult or made without regret; however, it was the best decision under the context and 
circumstances at the time. Id. 
 141. Tracy A. Thomas, Misappropriating Women’s History in the Law and Politics of Abor-
tion, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 8–10, 19, 28–31 (2012) (critiquing Feminist for Life’ representations 
of the historical record, with particular emphasis on statements by Elizabeth Cady Stanton). 
 142. Thayer Hardwick & Hillary Hodsdon, Abortion, 13 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 109, 116–18 
(2012) (discussing judicial bypass and whether it is effective in terms of treating adolescents with 
respect). 
 143. Henderson, supra note 31, at 1621. 
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easily, although mistakenly, undermine women’s power to choose.144 
Thus the term “reproductive justice” may be the better one to use now.145  
The 2013 Time Magazine cover story and others overlook the fact 
that for many years feminists tried to work with anti-abortion groups to 
find common ground, using support for women’s equality and opportuni-
ty, along with access to contraception and healthy families to bridge the 
gaps.146 We may be able to work with Catholics for Choice and others on 
obtaining access to contraception and promoting healthy families and 
adoptions, but only with the realization that they may not help when we 
advocate the right to abortion. Still, avoiding abortion is optimal for all 
concerned, and we should not decline alliances on some issues unless the 
risks of co-optation are high. 
Women’s voices in favor of abortion and contraception have been 
lost—in the legislatures, in the courts, and in the media—especially since 
Casey. Speaking out is crucial if we are to recover the stories of women 
who support abortion and who have had abortions and are relieved. 
While abortion opponents have emphasized studies that women regret 
abortion and posit a non-scientific “post-abortion syndrome” as a harm to 
women, most, if not all studies demonstrate that women have been 
helped by abortion and are better off than they would have been had they 
been forced to bear a child.147 The framing matters, and so do the stories 
of the millions of women who have had abortions (and millions more 
who use contraception!). 
C. Politics: Who Decides? 
Carol Sanger has rightly pointed out that “abortion politics” have 
infected every election from school boards on up.148 Women may whis-
per amongst themselves, but few women of prominence, not to mention 
the rest, speak up publically about having had abortions.149 Kate 
  
 144. See Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 
95 COLUM. L. REV. 304, 326–27 (1995) (examining tensions in feminist theory over women’s capac-
ity to choose under constrained conditions). 
 145. Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion 
Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394, 1408, 1425–27 (2009) (emphasizing issues of pregnancy and child care 
as connected to all parts of reproductive justice, as well as using Critical Legal Studies’ rights cri-
tique and criticisms of consent and choice in sexuality and pregnancy categories). 
 146. Pickert, supra note 38. 
 147. See Sanger, supra note 131, at 875–76. Sanger also notes that the “relief” doesn’t mean 
that the decision was not difficult or that there is no regret, id. at 876; but life is full of hard choices, 
and we make the best ones we can. There are no algorithms for moral and life choices unless one 
obeys rules no matter how stupid they are. Id. 
 148. Id. at 857. 
 149. Id. at 868. “Coming out” can be dangerous, but maybe our LGBT friends can assist us in 
finding ways to do this. I have often imagined distributing an anonymous questionnaire to female 
law professors, lawyers, and students on this issue. Women in power would be next—especially 
politicians. But I lack the empirical expertise to design a “good instrument” and get past a Human 
Subjects Committee. This seems so lame now. Maybe I should learn how to do the survey and de-
velop a plan. 
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Michelman, former director of the National Abortion Rights Action 
League (NARAL), is one of the few I can recall.150 Sarah Weddington, 
the lawyer who argued Roe as a young lawyer, is another.151 Ms. maga-
zine submitted to Congress a petition signed by thousands of women 
who had had abortions that only yielded a few thousand signatories—but 
maybe Ms. as print media could not mobilize the Internet capacities we 
have now.152 Prominent women avoid the topic in terms of their stories 
and personal history for many reasons, including, most important, their 
personal safety. Indeed, a current Internet effort to gather women’s sto-
ries of their abortion decisions, in order to counteract claims that women 
do not know what they are doing, has succeeded in gathering numerous 
posts, but many contributors have posted as “anonymous.”153 I personally 
am not surprised, because who wants to be harassed by zealots, much 
less threatened and trashed by other anonymous commenters? 
I believe that violence and threats against clinics, doctors who per-
form abortions, and local women who are abortion activists and speak in 
favor of abortion, have silenced many who support the right to decide 
whether to bear a child. Retaliation has its psychic costs for a sex-class 
vulnerable to violence to begin with. Protestors near abortion clinics 
force women seeking abortions to run a gantlet, although the Court has 
held that some restrictions on proximity to clinics and confrontation with 
patients do not violate the First Amendment.154 The protests intimidate 
legal abortion providers and counselors as well. The Court has held that 
  
 150. Linton Weeks, Kate Michelman, the Public Face of a Woman’s Right to Privacy, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 12, 2006, at C1. 
 151. I thank Pat Cain for pointing this out at the conference. See also SARAH WEDDINGTON, A 
QUESTION OF CHOICE 13–17 (Feminist Press 2d ed. 2013) (discussing the abortion she had as a 
graduate student in the late 1960s). 
 152. See We Had Abortions, MS. MAG. (Fall 2006), 
http://www.msmagazine.com/fall2006/abortionmag.asp. I thank Khiara Bridges for telling me a Ms. 
petition naming names existed and Stanford Law Library for finding the reference. 
 153. See Sharing Our Stories: I Was 16 Years Old…, MY ABORTION. MY LIFE., 
http://myabortionmylife.org/pages/sharing-our-stories.php#Iwas16 (last visited Feb. 5, 2014). 
 154. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 781 (2000) (upholding regulation prohibiting abortion 
protestors from approaching persons, distributing literature, and displaying signs within eight feet of 
a health care facility that provides abortions); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 377–
81 (1997) (upholding “fixed” fifteen-foot buffer zone and striking down the “floating buffer zones” 
on free speech grounds); Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 769–76 (1994) (up-
holding injunction barring picketing within thirty-six feet of a clinic on public property but exempt-
ing private property, and upholding noise injunction but striking down a 300 feet restriction). It is 
possible, however, Hill will be overruled by the United States Supreme Court. The Court granted 
certiorari in McCullen v. Coakley, 708 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2857 (2013). 
The case is part of a long-running challenge to a Massachusetts law making it a crime for speakers 
not involved with a “reproductive health care facility” to come within thirty-five feet of entries. Id. at 
3 (internal quotation mark omitted). Question two of the grant specifically asks if Hill “should be 
limited or overruled.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McCullen, 133 S. Ct. 2857 (No. 12-1168), 2013 
WL 1247969, at *i. 
  One of the most outrageous stories about anti-abortion protestors I’ve heard was from a 
friend whose very-wanted baby died in utero, through no one’s fault. Apparently, the safest place for 
her to have the fetus removed was an abortion clinic; imagine how she felt being yelled at and called 
a “baby-killer.” 
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picketing private residences may be regulated or prohibited.155 But still, 
the threat of violence remains: As the director of the only clinic in North 
Dakota, Tammi Kromenaker, a social worker, said, she “takes different 
routes to work every day to avoid falling into a routine that might make 
her a target . . . . ‘Even if I’m at Target looking at clothes, I never let my 
guard down.’”156  
Even being associated with reproductive justice has cost individual 
women in other ways: Professor Dawn Johnsen, an extremely well-
qualified nominee to head the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the 
Obama Administration’s Justice Department, was pilloried by Republi-
cans for her decades-old association with abortion rights at the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and as Legal Director of what is now 
NARAL-Pro Choice America.157 Eventually, she withdrew from consid-
eration,158 and there still is no permanent Assistant Attorney General 
running the OLC.159 I personally recall Senator Harry Reid, now Senate 
Majority Leader, trying to negotiate difficult political terrain by “smug-
gling” Kate Michelman into Nevada to speak to selected Democrats 
about insurance coverage for contraception under federal law. There was 
no general public announcement and no local coverage of the meeting. 
Further, Texas Governor Rick Perry recently attacked Texas State Sena-
tor Wendy Davis’s filibuster against an extremely restrictive law, and 
said that if abortion had been available to Ms. Davis’s mother, Davis 
would not have “managed to eventually graduate from Harvard Law 
School . . . . It is just unfortunate that she hasn’t learned from her own 
example that every life must be given a chance to realize its full potential 
and that every life matters.”160 
  
 155. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487–88 (1988) (upholding ban on focused picketing of 
abortion doctor’s residence under First Amendment). 
 156. Pickert, supra note 38. 
 157. Professor Johnsen’s curriculum vitae reveals that she was Acting Assistant Attorney 
General in charge of the OLC during the Clinton Administration. She has also been the Legal Direc-
tor of the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights League (now NARAL-Pro Choice) from 1988 
to 1993, and a lawyer for the ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project. Dawn Johnsen, Curriculum 
Vitae, available at http://newsinfo.iu.edu/pub/libs/images/usr/6107_h.pdf. The Republicans never let 
her nomination to head OLC go forward, and she eventually withdrew from consideration. Charlie 
Savage, Long After Nomination, an Obama Choice Withdraws, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2010, at A16. 
Of course, she also had the temerity to be a Democrat in Indiana. I proudly admit, I am a former 
colleague of hers. 
 158. Savage, supra note 157. 
 159. Caroline Diane Krass became the Acting Assistant Attorney General in charge of the 
Office of Legal Counsel on December 21, 2013; however, as of this writing, she has not been con-
firmed by the Senate. See Meet the Leadership: Acting Assistant Attorney General Official Biog-
raphy, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/olc/meet-olc.html (last updated Jan. 2014). 
 160. Igor Volsky, Rick Perry Attacks Wendy Davis: ‘She Was a Teenage Mother Herself,’ 
THINKPROGRESS (June 27, 2013, 11:57 AM), 
http://thinkprogress.org/health/2013/06/27/2227101/rick-perry-attacks-wendy-davis-she-was-a-
teenage-mother-herself/. Exactly how does Governor Perry know that? Who appointed him the 
ultimate arbiter over women’s decisions? 
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No wonder people run scared, especially in an age of tweets, Inter-
net defamations from anonymous sources, push-polls implying pro-
choice female candidates for elected office had an abortion, and a dis-
course of trashing, all protected by the First Amendment’s Free Speech 
or Free Press Clauses.  
The Time Magazine article also speaks of a split between the origi-
nal activists and younger women who do not identify with the old guard 
of the feminist movement.161 The younger women reject the term pro-
choice and wish to focus more broadly on “reproductive justice.”162 They 
have energy and skills to mobilize in new and promising ways; I just 
hope that intergenerational conflicts can be bridged. Ann built bridges, 
and there is no reason not to build bridges across generations here be-
cause so much is at stake.  
One idea I had for mobilization was Kate Michelman’s “Who De-
cides?” campaign. It may not work now, but it is worth exploring. Who, 
indeed, has the power to decide what “reasons” are “good enough” to 
have an abortion or have access to contraception? A state legislature that 
decides a rape victim cannot get an abortion because a born child would 
be “evidence” of the rape? Or one that declares that once a doctor can 
detect a fetal heartbeat—maybe just as the woman is realizing she is 
pregnant, having missed a period—there can be no abortion no matter 
what? Or the legislature that decides abortion is permissible only if the 
woman’s life is in danger? Who decides? What “counts”? For the medi-
cal review committee in Doe v. Bolton, the companion case to Roe, it 
was not enough that Mary Doe had already lost custody of three children. 
As Robin West has pointed out, this “mentally unwell, emotionally un-
stable, economically impoverished, noncustodial mother[,] and aban-
doned wife” could not obtain permission from a medical panel to have an 
abortion.163 While this might smack of eugenics, it also indicates that 
decisions by supposedly neutral parties may result in anguish and pain. 
As for feminist method, women’s voices matter. Women I know 
and love may have wildly varying stereotypes or stories about when and 
why a woman’s reasons for abortion are “good enough.” Moral intuitions 
can vary deeply, and unless one takes an absolutist position against all 
abortion, moral intuitions provide little guidance for general laws.164 I 
keep hearing secondhand stories about women who use abortion as their 
primary method of birth control and that seems careless. I might think it 
“enough” reason in a case of a bullied sixteen-year-old who was raped 
because she became intoxicated at a party, or that it is “enough” reason 
  
 161. Pickert, supra note 38. 
 162. Id.; See also West, supra note 145, at 1426–32 (summarizing arguments for changing 
from “choice” to “reproductive justice”). 
 163. West, supra note 31, at 123. 
 164. See generally ROBERT AUDI, THE GOOD IN THE RIGHT: A THEORY OF INTUITION AND 
INTRINSIC VALUE 197–202 (2004) (detailing the concept of intuitionism as moral philosophy). 
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for a terrified nineteen-year-old in college who had a scholarship and 
would have had to lose it if she had to carry the fetus to term. Then there 
is my own story of a “real” rape when I was in the ER demanding DES, 
and that makes me think any form of unwanted sex is “enough.” For an-
other person, a good enough reason is taking antidepressants or other 
medications that carry risks to a fetus. For another, it is a boyfriend or 
husband who has abused her. For another, a woman learns of severe birth 
defects that her family cannot afford to support. For another, all the 
woman’s precautions failed, and maybe the man is telling her to “get an 
abortion.” Or maybe it is only “enough” if the unborn child suffers from 
a fatal defect and will not survive or the mother’s life is in extreme dan-
ger.165 
What reasons are “good enough?” Should the burden be placed on 
women to perform according to someone else’s opinions and expecta-
tions? Surely the woman or teenager or child who has to bear the preg-
nancy is in the best position to decide—under the facts and circumstanc-
es of her life—whether to carry the fetus to term, not to mention the trag-
edies when the fetus cannot survive or would have a short life. A woman 
is certainly in a better position to decide than a legislature or anyone else 
when she can have a child. 
Ultimately as scholars, we may think we lack political skills. But 
Ann worked diligently with LGBT groups in New Mexico to get modifi-
cations to the state antidiscrimination statute for LGBT persons.166 We 
have a voice. The result was a substantively important change in the 
law.167 Working with local politicians and the legislative process is im-
portant. The Democratic Party in Texas may have “failed,” but Wendy 
Davis and abortion-rights advocates put up an important fight without 
much time to organize.  
We may be naïve about our particular legislature or local govern-
ment, and the current Congress may be dysfunctional, but there is infor-
mation out there on how to be effective politically, even without billion-
aire funding. Understanding how legislators and legislatures work may 
be difficult, but lawyers are an important category of legislators and 
staff, so finding common ground and working on proposals is possible.  
President Obama recently came out in support of Planned 
Parenthood, even though anti-abortion attacks quickly followed.168 But 
  
 165. See Associated Press, Bill Allowing Life-Saving Abortions Passes 1st Round, S.F. 
CHRON., July 3, 2013, at A3 (noting that Ireland’s complete ban was revisited after death of woman 
because doctors refused to perform surgery). 
 166. Scales, Poststructuralism, supra note 13, at 398. 
 167. Id. at 398–99. 
 168. Peter Baker, In Speech to Planned Parenthood, Obama Criticizes New Abortion Laws, 
CAUCUS: POLITICS & GOVERNMENT BLOG TIMES (Apr. 26, 2013, 1:27 PM), 
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we have an ally for a while. Many of us may not be good lobbyists, but 
may know of good lobbyists and have connections through our local bar 
associations and other groups. Nonprofits may be barred from direct 
funding or campaigning, but they contribute to dialogue. I am sure there 
are many other ways to work towards reproductive justice, and I hope 
that we will find them. Ann did, and we could do worse than follow her 
courageous example.  
CONCLUSION 
Ann Scales was a brilliant and loving scholar. I have tried to carry 
through one of her messages as best I can. We can all honor her by trying 
to carry her love and passion for her work forward.  
May the Goddess, Spirits, God, whatever, be with you, dear Ann. 
You will always be alive in our hearts, and the work you started will 
continue, as this Symposium attests. 
 
